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Abstract  
Recent research on Muslim populations has offered interesting but limited insights about 
values preferences. This mixed-methods study examines the prevalence of support for pa-
triarchy among a sample of religious Muslim university students in Southern Thailand us-
ing items from the World Values Survey. It also investigates the durability of these pref-
erences by examining correlations between support or opposition to patriarchal values 
with preferences towards courtship practices, and elements that influence respondents’ 
views on gender roles, particularly related to the contemporary socioeconomic and po-
litical situation facing the Muslim minority of Southern Thailand. 
Keywords: Muslims, Patriarchy, Southern Thailand, Values, World Values Survey      
Background 
Multiple commentators have discussed political and cultural values within the Islamic 
world writ large, mostly within the context of post-colonial Islamic resurgence  (Esposito 
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and Voll 1996; Hunter 1998; Kabuli 1994; Lewis 2002; Midlarsky 1998). Harvard political 
scientist Samuel Huntington famously posited a stark distinction between Islamic and 
Western “civilizations,” arguing that Islamic societies are predisposed against democratic 
governance and values (Huntington 1993, 1996). Subsequently, scholars such as Edward 
Said challenged the Huntington thesis as a reductionist assertion that justified western 
confrontation towards the Islamic world (Chowdhry 2007; Said 2001; Tuastad 2003). Since 
that debate has evolved, empirical evidence has not substantiated simplistic assertions. 
Utilizing data from the World Values Survey – a comparative social values study adminis-
tered across over 70 nations - Inglehart and Norris demonstrated that support for demo-
cratic governance in Islamic and western nations were similar (Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Norris and Inglehart 2002), a conclusion also supported by Rowley and Smith’s analysis 
of World Values Survey data (Rowley and Smith 2009). Other studies have confirmed the 
thesis that Muslims support democratic governance and political values, despite the rel-
ative absence of democratic governments in Islamic nations (Braizat 2010; Jamal and Tes-
sler 2008; Mogahed and Abdo 2006; Shafiq 2010). 
Concurrent with these findings, however, other empirical studies have found that al-
though Muslims strongly support democratic political values and institutions, they main-
tain patriarchal social values (Alexander and Welzel 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2002; Rizzo 
et al. 2007). Norris and Inglehart used World Values Survey items to compare support for 
political and social values in Islamic majority countries against western/non-Muslim ma-
jority nations. They found an overall trend showing stronger levels of support for patriar-
chal values within Islamic-majority nations compared to western ones (2002). Rizzo and 
colleagues also used World Values Survey items to compare Muslim-majority Arab coun-
tries (defined as nations who were members of the League of Arab States) versus select 
non-Arab, Muslim-majority nations (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan and 
Turkey). They found that support for traditional patriarchal values was higher in the Arab 
nations than the non-Arab ones (2007). That finding comports with theories suggesting 
that political context may play a significant role in explaining differing levels of patriar-
chy across Islamic nations (Bellin 2004; Fish 2002; Karatnycky 2002). Stepan and Robert-
son found that non-Arab, Muslim nations were more likely to have democratic compo-
nents in their electoral and political cultures than traditionally authoritarian Arab nations 
(2003), supporting modernism theories assuming that democracy is a pre-requisite for 
the development of culturally liberal ideas. 
Other commentators have pointed to macro-level factors in developing nations that 
drive low levels of female literacy and educational achievement - characteristics present 
in Muslim and non-Muslim societies throughout the global south (Marcoux 1998; Rigg 
2006). On the other hand, Alexander and Welzel found that in both predominantly Mus-
lim and non-Muslim societies, self-identifying Muslims show higher prevalence of support 
for patriarchal values than non-Muslims (2011). This comports with studies showing per-
sistent support for traditional values among Muslim immigrants in non- Muslim nations 
(Buijs and Rath 2002; Fetzer and Soper 2005). Thus, much of the academic work suggests 
that Muslims support democratic political values but seek to maintain traditional social 
structures (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 2008), though there are variations on theories 
explaining why these preferences exist. Within popular cultures, however, the extreme 
otherness of Muslims has led to the proliferation of negative representations conflating 
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Islam with harmful practices towards women, such as female genital mutilation, “honor 
killings”, and other cultural practices prevalent in some Muslim-majority nations, or ex-
tremist segments which have dominated media depictions of Muslims since 9/11 (Abbas 
2004; Husain and O’Brien 2000; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). 
There is a need for more studies investigating the factors associated with support for 
patriarchy among Muslim populations. Lack of access to populations, disciplinary lim-
itations, or Islamophobic assumptions behind scholarship may continue to drive sim-
plistic understandings of gender values among Muslim populations. Critics have long 
lamented these shortcomings, particularly in terms of how they have strengthened ste-
reotypes about Muslim societies. Edward Said attacked the trope of the submissive Mus-
lim woman, not to defend actual oppression of women, but to point out its centrality to 
the narrative of The Orient (1979). Chandra Mohanty and others have argued that west-
ern second wave feminists have unconsciously reproduced a simplistic conceptualiza-
tion of “third world women” ignoring local contexts, social practices, class, religion, and 
other factors (1988). Because of mainstream western feminism’s historical grounding in 
secular and western societies, religion — and particularly Islam — has been cast as an 
inherently patriarchal system, therefore contributing to the orientalist notion that Islam 
excludes the possibility of a “western” understanding of gender equality within Muslim 
societies (Salem 2013). This critique follows from the work of Saba Mahmood (2011), 
Lila Abu-Lughod (2002), and others who have questioned reductionist discourses about 
Muslim women. 
Critical race scholars also provide an insightful perspective on this discussion. Origi-
nating from African-American critique of the United States’ legal system, these scholars 
reacted to the limiting binaries of gender and race to the experiences of Black-American 
women, and highlighted the importance of recognizing the existence of multiple identi-
ties within a dynamic society of overlapping power relations (Crenshaw 1989, 1991). Kim-
berle Crenshaw, for example, argued that African- American women may sometimes ex-
perience sexism similar to that of a white woman, or racism similar to that of a black man. 
However, their lived experiences fail to bifurcate into either category separately, or the sum 
of both, but to an array of multidimensional experiences unique to black women (1989). 
Similarly, we should expect that lived experiences in local contexts among Muslims 
should impact their attitudes regarding gender values. A major distinction might be made 
between Muslims in majority-Islamic nations versus Muslims living in societies as religious 
or ethnic minorities. In recent years, there has been a surge in scholarship on Muslim mi-
norities in western countries, particularly European nations (Abbas 2004, 2007; Khan 2000; 
Husain and O’Brien 2000; Peach and Glebe 1995) and also the United States (Haniff 2003; 
Kurien 2001; Maira 2005; Schmidt 2004). Although the breadth and variety of such stud-
ies defy easy categorization, those that have examined Muslim immigrant integration in 
western environments and effects on religious values have confirmed trends aligning with 
classical assimilationist theories (Maliepaard et al. 2010; Van Tubergen 2007), as well as 
more segmented assimilation patterns dependent on individual level characteristics or 
post-immigration environmental contexts (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Güveli and Platt 
2011; Smits et al. 2010). Other examinations have identified reactive identification trends 
among Muslim immigrants to the west as a result of stigma, or real or perceived hostility 
(Kunst et al. 2012; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Shirazi and Mishra 2010). The French law 
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banning practices of veiling and the subsequent resistance by French Muslim women was 
a visible reflection of the latter phenomenon (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2005; Werbner 
2007; Wing and Smith 2005). Yet despite the scholarly attention devoted to Muslim mi-
norities in western nations, as noted by Hamid (2015) — the majority of the world’s Mus-
lim minorities live outside the west, and a considerable amount in Asian nations. Addi-
tionally, these minorities are not post-colonial immigrants, but indigenous to their home 
nations, and many have historically experienced historical discrimination in these envi-
ronments for some time. 
The Malay-Muslim minority of Southern Thailand presents a salient opportunity to ex-
plore these issues. Muslims are the largest religious minority in Thailand, but compose the 
majority of the population in the southern part of the country (Thai National Statistics Of-
fice 2000). The three southernmost provinces of Thailand were previously an independent 
Islamic sultanate with strong cultural orientations to the Malay world (Jory 2007; Puaksom 
2008). The region was brought under Siamese control through the expansion of the Thai 
state in the early twentieth century (Aphornsuvan 2008). This included the use of harsh 
state policies during the administration of Field Marshall Phibun Songkram during World 
War II to assimilate the local population into the majority Thai Buddhist nation (Boonpra-
karn et al. 2015; Koch 1977; Ockey 2011; Scupin 1987; Winichakul 2000). This included 
prohibitions on the use of the native Malay dialect, banning of head scarves, imposition 
of Buddhist worship in schools, and other restrictions on Muslim religious expression to 
suppress or eradicate ethnic Malay and Islamic practices (Khareng et al. 2015). More re-
cently, violence in the area has flared between pro-separatist insurgents and Thai govern-
ment forces, leading to a state of persistent unrest in the south (Askew 2008; Liow 2004; 
McCargo 2006). Violence surged in 2004, after over 70 Muslim protesters died from suf-
focation after being arrested and forced into Thai military trucks (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 
2008). Since then, Human Rights Watch has estimated that over 6000 people have died 
in related violence (Human Rights Watch 2015). The southern Muslim-majority provinces 
remain the only parts of the country that have remained under martial law in Thailand 
for the past decade, with wide ranging allegations of arbitrary arrests, searches, torture, 
and extrajudicial killings of civilians (ACARM 2012; Amnesty International 2009; Human 
Rights Watch 2007, 2010a). 
Concurrent with this political backdrop has been a growth in Islamic identity formation 
within Thailand, and particularly in the three southern provinces where Malay Muslims form 
the majority population. This trend can be credited to a mix of factors, including the in-
creased educational and cultural links between Thailand’s Muslim community and the wider 
Islamic world (Liow 2010; Horstmann 2007; Madmarn 2009; Yusuf 2007); changing Thai gov-
ernment policies accommodating Malay-Muslim practices and expressions (Islam 2006; 
Yusuf 2006); and Islamic group identity formation as resistance to Thai cultural hegemony 
(Lyndon et al. 2015; Marddent 2007; Peow 2009). This has manifested in significant shifts 
towards more fundamentalist expressions of Islam and growth in Islamic religious school-
ing and culture in the south (Liow 2010; Mutalib 1990). However, there have been few re-
cent studies examining social values among Muslim youth in the southern provinces of Thai-
land. Sateemae and colleagues examined perceptions of social problems among southern 
Muslim adolescents by their parents (2015). Laeheem and colleagues (2013; 2014) and Ma-
hamad et al. (2008) have reviewed socialization of Islamic values among youth in the three 
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southern provinces, as well as use of Islamic educational approaches towards drug use and 
criminal behavior among youth (Laeheem and Madreh 2014; Laeheem et al. 2014). Lateh 
and Mudor examined attitudes towards wearing the hijab among southern university stu-
dents (2014). Chaiprasit et al. (2005), and Wibulswasdi-Anderson and Anderson (1986) have 
looked at sexual practices among southern Muslim adolescents. 
Of course, an obvious difficulty with ascribing any categorical inferences about so-
cial values preferences on the Malay Muslim population is the diversity of the commu-
nity, particularly in terms of religious cultures. Although it is true that the three southern 
provinces are historically and ethnically different from Muslim communities in other parts 
of Thailand, even within the three provinces there are clear distinctions to be found (Joll 
2011). Historically, local Muslim culture was syncretic in nature and contained influences 
from animist or Hindu cosmologies (see, e.g., Fraser 1966). The ascendance of the Tablighi 
Jama’at and Salafiyyah movements has challenged this milieu. The transnational Tablighi 
Jama’at has established a significant presence and wide following in the three provinces. 
As a revivalist, missionary movement with a firm setting in formalistic Sunni tradition, the 
Tablighi Jama’at have inspired locals to adhere to core teachings and practices which em-
phasize the movement’s focus on personal spiritual faith, piety, and proselytization (Horst-
mann 2007). The Tablighi Jama’at are known to focus their missionary efforts on rural and 
lower-income families. They have also successfully opened Tahfiz schools (Quranic memo-
rization) throughout the region. The Tablighi Jama’at proselytizers and communities have 
adopted fundamentalist expressions that encourage rejection of materialism. However, the 
leaders of the movement have maintained good relations with local authorities by stress-
ing peace, focusing on missionary work, and rejecting involvement in political controver-
sies because such activity is not deemed central to Muslim faith or practice. 
Unlike the South Asian-based Tablighi Jama’at, the Salafiyyah movement in Southern 
Thailand has developed directly from the historical ties between the Malay-Muslim schol-
arly community and religious universities in Mecca. The basic assertion of the Salafiyyah 
is that the practice of Islam has not been correctly adhered to since the time of the early 
Muslims, necessitating a return to the true monotheistic Islam of the early period (Gauvain 
2012). The Salafiyyah in Thailand have successfully leveraged scholarly expertise and cred-
ibility with financial support from Arab gulf nations to expand Sunni Islamic reformism 
in the three southern provinces, primarily through the reach of educational institutions 
(Liow 2010). The Salafiyyah leadership have also earned trust or established key partner-
ships with the Thai government and elite members of the political establishment, and 
embraced principles of multi-religious friendship and a commitment to working within 
the Thai legal and political system (Yahprung 2014). They have extended their influence 
in local communities through the sanctioning and proliferation of integrated Islamic and 
secular curriculums into Islamic private schools throughout the area. This has served the 
purpose of increasing quality education in orthodox Islamic principles among area youth, 
while satisfying government requirements to teach the standard Thai national curriculum 
under the Thai Education Act. Like the Tablighi Jama’at, they actively encourage peaceful 
relations, compliance with the law, and avoiding conflict with Thai authorities in order to 
continue their religious missions. The Salafiyyah have similarly inspired an increased and 
highly visible surge in conservative religious practices, ideology, and personal and com-
munal expressions of piety (Marddent 2013). 
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It is worth recognizing that both movements have clearly distinct historical origins, 
scholastic traditions, and ascribed purposes (sometimes at odds with each other), though 
a complete discussion is not warranted here. Suffice to say, for most residents of the area, 
the everyday relevance of these movements on the Malay Muslim minority lies not in dif-
ferences among scholarly theological discourse, but their significant role in Islamic iden-
tity formation. Although both the formal Tablighi Jama’at and Salafiyyah movements in 
the three provinces are avowedly apolitical or politics-neutral, their organic emergence 
among an ethnic and religious minority that has been historically oppressed serves as a 
strong facilitator of collective identity formation (Marddent 2007, 2013). 
Some commentators have argued that these religious identity movements have en-
couraged gendered roles among activists. Marddent (2013) has asserted that some Ma-
lay Muslim women encounter difficulties in asserting rights because of the negative as-
sociations of such activities with western feminist and secular movements. Pollachom 
has also discussed how some Malay Muslim women have chosen to promote traditional 
family life as expressions of religious solidarity, while simultaneously furthering women-
focused Islamic social and education activities (2014). In contrast, Neelaphaijit has of-
fered sharp criticism, and argued that Malay Muslim women in the three provinces have 
been marginalized by male-dominated institutions, and have endured layered victimiza-
tion as a result of the political violence. As illustrative examples, she points to the cases 
in which Thai security forces have sexually assaulted or raped Malay Muslim women — 
situations in which the victims are unlikely to receive redress either by the government 
or local communities due to the highly stigmatizing nature of sexual violation in Muslim 
culture (Neelapaijit 2009). 
Although the small number of empirical studies on Malay Muslims in Thailand is grow-
ing, we have found no studies that have implemented World Values Survey items to Mus-
lim populations in Thailand, or examined attitudes towards gender equality or patriarchy 
specifically. This study has several purposes. First, we wanted to implement the World Val-
ues Survey items among a sample of Malay Muslims in Thailand as an indication of pref-
erences for or against patriarchy. A convenience sample was employed of students at a 
private Islamic university in the south. We utilized items measuring support for patriar-
chy from the most recent (sixth wave) version of the World Values Survey to explore this 
question. We also wanted to examine our respondents’ attitudes on these items relative 
to comparison populations — a viable inquiry given the availability of such data from pre-
vious administrations of the World Values Survey. 
Secondly, and more importantly, we wanted to examine the durability of support for or 
against patriarchal values among our sample population as reflected in the World Values 
Survey responses, and explore perspectives explaining our survey findings. We did this in 
two ways. In our survey, we included items on preferences towards heterosexual court-
ship practices. Courtship is generally defined as activities in which two people develop a 
relationship towards romantic partnership and marriage. We define agency in courtship 
as individual control over choices towards finding a mate. We examined the relationship 
between preferences among our sample regarding patriarchal values, and preferences re-
garding agency in courtship. We selected this focus because, even though courtship be-
havior is regulated by Islamic law and local customs, preferences towards courtship may 
indicate variability reflecting individualized negotiations of social conventions (see, e.g., 
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Platt 2010). It should be noted that the traditional discourse about the relationship be-
tween gender attitudes and agency reflects assumptions about agency as a response to 
social subjugation (Abrams 1995; Davies 1991; McNay 2010), and has led to an extensive 
debate on the topic among scholars of feminism (Burke 2012; Chen 2013; Hatton and 
Trautner 2013). However, our concern with agency in courtship is restricted to its function 
measuring behavioral preferences as a function of values, as per traditional social values-
beliefs theory (Rokeach 1973). 
Additionally, we convened a focus group to assess respondents’ perspectives on the 
reasoning behind their World Values Survey item answers on patriarchy. The qualitative 
approach was specifically aimed at identifying the “why” behind our quantitative results. 
We were particularly interested in exploring the relevance of how ethnic minority status, 
local conditions related to the current conflict, and non-religious factors impacted respon-
dents’ attitudes towards patriarchy as measured in the World Values Survey items. Fol-
lowing from the works of critical scholars on Islam noted previously, this exploration was 
important to investigate local context and lived experiences within a conflict zone that 
might explain the values preferences revealed in the survey responses, and challenge any 
unsubstantiated conclusions, stereotypes or assumptions. 
Methods 
The quantitative data used in this research was gathered from a survey implemented 
in the summer of 2015. The survey included select questions from Wave 6 of the World 
Values Survey in the Thai language. Those questions were: “When jobs are scarce, men 
should have more right to a job than women”, “On the whole, men make better political 
leaders than women do”, and “A university education is more important for a boy than a 
girl”. These three questions have previously been used and validated as a scale to mea-
sure support for patriarchy among Muslim populations by Alexander and Welzel (2011). 
Both Rizzo et al. (2007) and Asadullah and Chaudhury (2010) have also employed varia-
tions on these questions to measure support for patriarchy among Muslim populations. 
The three WVS questions on gender equality had different response scales, and were thus 
recoded into a uniform scale for consistency (0–1.0), using the same method employed 
by Alexander and Welzel (2011). Questions on courtship practices were based on items 
from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (2005). Those questions asked respondents to 
rate the acceptability of meeting partners: “through school or college”, “online through 
the internet”, “through dating”, “through friends”, “on parent’s request”, and “through ar-
ranged marriage”, and utilized a consistent response scale. We also included questions 
on gender and age. All additional questions besides the WVS items were translated into 
standard Thai language, piloted with native Thai speakers, and re-translated into English 
for verification by the authors. 
The survey was compiled into a written questionnaire and administered with students 
from a private Islamic university in Pattani province, Thailand. Permission for the data col-
lection was granted by university administrators. A total of 329 students were provided 
the survey, and 186 completed and returned it for a response rate of 56%. All students 
had major fields from the Faculty of Social Sciences, and were from second and third year 
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classes. Table 1 displays gender and age of respondents. Respondents were overwhelm-
ingly female.1 Analysis of survey data was completed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences 23.0.  
Following completion of the survey, the authors conducted a semi-structured focus 
group with seven respondents (6 female and 1 male). We gauged respondents’ approaches 
to the three survey items measuring support for patriarchy with a central question of, “Why 
did you answer the survey items the way you did?” followed by probing as appropriate. 
The responses were recorded and coded by the authors using ATLAS.ti 7.0 software. An 
organic, grounded theory approach was used to independently code focus group con-
tent, and identify themes that were relevant to explaining respondents’ survey answers 
(Charmaz 2011; Strauss and Corbin 1990).  
Results 
Survey data 
Support for patriarchy and peer comparisons 
Our survey sample responses showed relatively high levels of support for patriarchy. Our 
sample’s responses and comparison responses are displayed in Table 2. Four populations 
from Wave 6 were used as comparisons. Respondents aged 19–25 only were used from 
the comparison populations. The first comparison group was the Thailand sample (n = 71), 
the home nation, of which the majority of people are Thai Buddhist. The second compar-
ison group was the Malaysia sample (n = 211), the Muslim-majority nation that borders 
Southern Thailand, and shares many cultural characteristics with ethnic Malay Muslims 
in Thailand. Thirdly, we compared our sample against respondents from an aggregate of 
ASEAN nations – the ten nation regional association of South East Asia. We wished to do 
this to establish where the sample stood against a more regional milieu on patriarchal val-
ues. However, Wave 6 currently only includes responses from four ASEAN members: Ma-
laysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore (n = 792). Thus, responses were aggregated 
from those four nations only. Finally, we wished to compare our sample against Muslim-
majority Arab nations. We employed the same approach that Rizzo and colleagues used 
towards identifying this group, which was selecting Wave 6 participants that were mem-
bers of the League of Arab Nations (Rizzo et al. 2007). This included an aggregate of re-
spondents from the country samples for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Leb-
anon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia and Yemen (n = 3292). 
MANOVA tests for the three patriarchy items were completed for our sample against 
each of the four comparison groups. There was a significant difference found between our 
sample and their Thai peers (F(3, 189) = 82.647), p < .001), Malaysian peers (F(3, 329) = 
31.218, p < .001), the aggregate of four ASEAN nations (F(3, 910) = 65.334, p < .001), and 
the aggregate of Arab nations (F(3, 3288) = 34.481, p < .001). For Thailand, Malaysia, and 
1 As of the semester of April 2016, the university had a gender makeup of 66% female. The female majority of our 
sample was thus higher than their overall representativeness in the university.   
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the Arab nations aggregate, all three patriarchy questions contributed to the significant 
difference in means for the MANOVA tests. For the ASEAN aggregate, two of the ques-
tions contributed to the significant difference, and one did not (“When jobs are scarce, 
men should have more right to a job than women.”) 
Our sample’s responses to the patriarchy items indicated that they were quite con-
servative relative to the other comparison groups. The differences in means and respec-
tive standard deviations for the 3 questions across the comparison groups are displayed 
in Figs. 1, 2 and 3. For each of the question response scales, a lower response indicated 
greater levels of agreement with question statements assuming patriarchal values. Thus, 
Table 1. Survey sample characteristics 
Gender   Age 
Male  Female  19  20  21  22  23  24  25+ 
23/12.4%  163/87.6%  16.8.6%  40/21.5%  52/28.0%  27/14.5%  35/18.8%  10/5.4%  6/3.2%  
Table 2. Support for patriarchy 
  Mean  SD  N  F  p 
Item: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 
(1 = Agree, 3 = Disagree) 
 Sample  1.98  0.738  122 
 Thailand  2.42  0.690  71  16.633  .001* 
 Malaysia  1.73  0.845  211  7.914  .005* 
 ASEAN‡  2.01  0.861  792  .076  .783 
 Arab‡‡  1.61  0.832  3170  24.262  .001* 
Item: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 
(1 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Strongly Disagree) 
 Sample  1.36  0.546  122 
 Thailand  2.87  0.877  71  217.940  .001* 
 Malaysia  2.01  0.822  211  60.476  .001* 
 ASEAN‡  2.40  0.841  792  174.027  .001* 
 Arab‡‡  1.82  0.935  3170  29.091  .001* 
Item: A university education is more important for a boy than a girl. 
(1 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Strongly Disagree) 
 Sample  2.35  1.028  122 
 Thailand  3.17  0.697  71  35.322  .001* 
 Malaysia  2.61  0.931  211  5.534  .019* 
 ASEAN‡  2.84  0.896  792  29.830  .001* 
 Arab‡‡  2.76  1.056  3170  17.742  .001* 
*Significance at <0.05 
‡ ASEAN nations include Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore 
‡‡ Arab nations include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pales-
tine, Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen  
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higher group means indicate greater support for gender equality, and lower means in-
dicate greater support for more socially conservative, patriarchal values. On two of the 
questions, our sample scored significantly lower than all other groups (“On the whole, 
men make better political leaders than women do” and “A university education is more 
important for a boy than a girl”). On the jobs questions, our sample scored in the mid-
dle, higher than the Malaysian and Arab respondents, lower than Thai respondents, and 
equal to ASEAN respondents.2  
Agency in Courtship 
The six questions related to agency in courtship were factor analyzed using principal 
component analysis. Using a varimax extraction, Eigenvalues yielded two factors greater 
than 1.0 that accounted for 33% and 27% of the variance. An oblimin rotation was also 
conducted, which yielded a similar factor structure. The first factor was labeled Personal 
Choice as it reflected personal agency in courtship, and the second Family Choice as it 
reflected more deference to the family’s voice in courtship (Table 3). 
Factor loadings were sufficiently strong at a level greater than .7 for five of the six meth-
ods, with the Personal Choice factor including meeting partners through school or col-
lege (.702), online (.707), or through dating (.811). Variables that loaded highly on Family 
Choice included meeting partners through arranged marriage (.795), and on parent’s re-
quest (.749). The final method — meeting partners through friends, split relatively evenly 
between both factors, though slightly higher on the Personal Choice factor (.550). Factor 
scores were created for both factors 1 and 2 for correlation analysis. 
Correlations between support for patriarchy and Agency in Courtship 
A total Gender Equality Score was calculated for all members of our sample by averaging 
the 0–1.0 recoded score for the three patriarchy questions. A higher score represented a 
general preference for gender equality and rejection of patriarchal norms. Interestingly, 
a one-way ANOVA indicated no significant relationship between gender of respondents 
and the Gender Equality Score (F(1120) = 2.264, p = .135) among our respondents. Find-
ing no relationship between gender and the Gender Equality Score, we then conducted 
Pearson correlations to identify relationships between the Gender Equality Score, the six 
individual items for agency in courtship, and both the Personal Choice and Family Choice 
factors (See Table 4). 
We found a moderate positive correlation between the Gender Equality Score and Fac-
tor 1 (Personal Choice) (r = .240, p < 0.01), as well as with two of the agency in courtship 
items affiliated with Personal Choice approaches: meeting partners through the internet (r 
= .298, p < 0.01), and dating (r = .195, p < 0.05). There was no correlation between Gen-
der Equality and Factor 2 (Family Choice).  
2 It should also be noted that although we only included respondents aged 19–25 among the peer comparison 
populations from World Values Study respondents, the gender representation was not similar. Among the WVS 
populations, gender representation was tended to be approximately 50% female and 50% male.   
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Focus group data 
What influenced responses on patriarchy items? 
Focus group respondents offered numerous perspectives on how they answered the sur-
vey items on patriarchy. Many of the themes reflected the relevance of the socioeconomic 
and political situation in the south. Focus group participants discussed at length how 
their negotiations of the survey questions were based on considerations of their families’ 
financial well-being, and how the low-wages generated by rubber-tapping (a principal 
source of income for many families) influenced division of labor choices among families 
and children. One persistent theme was the limited opportunities young men have to ad-
vance financially or occupationally. This appeared to influence respondents to answer sur-
vey items in a way to prioritize opportunities or favor higher social status for men, par-
ticularly since younger men may be considered at risk for drug use or other anti-social or 
criminal behavior. Some participants also believed that safety concerns were important 
factors behind considerations about the appropriateness of men or women working out-
side the home. The participants also noted that men are traditionally expected to take a 
Fig. 1. Comparison on job scarcity  
Fig. 2. Comparison on political leaders  
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leadership role in work or business, particularly since the majority of work in the area is 
agricultural or labor intensive. There were also preferences expressed supporting the no-
tion that women were better fit to stay home and raise families, rather than work. Finally, 
a number of students expressed adherence to traditional Islamic legal principles that men 
should be responsible for the economic well-being of women and children: 
“Nowadays, money is difficult. My parents earn only 70 Baht per day from rubber 
tapping, while we need money for food and school and colleges. My only brother has 
to help my parents in their work. Only me and my sister are supported to go to col-
lege.” (Female) 
Fig. 3. Comparison on university education   
Table 3. Agency in courtship eigenvalues and factor loadings 
Factor Analysis, Varimax Rotation 
Factor  Eigenvalue  % Variance  Cumulative % 
1  1.963  32.716  32.716 
2  1.645 27.415  60.131 
3  0.775  12.919  73.050 
4  0.679  11.324  84.374 
5  0.550  9.172  93.547 
6  0.387  6.453  100.000 
   
How acceptable is it for young Muslims to meet their   Factor 1  Factor 2
    partners through each of the following ways?   Personal Choice  Family Choice 
Through school of college   .702  .065 
Online through internet chatrooms, discussion forums, online  .707  −.478
     dating or social media 
Through dating   .811  −.064 
Through friends   .550  .463 
Through arranged marriage   .015  .795 
On parent’s request   .103  .749 
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“If jobs are scarce, I think we should see which jobs are right for each sex. Some jobs 
are good for women, some jobs are more suitable for men. Some women work until 
night. Riding from work at night is dangerous, especially for women.” (Male) 
“Many women work until the night time. They then cannot be good mothers.” 
(Female) 
“Islamic law provides the complete protection for female’s welfare, as females are seen 
as the most vulnerable. Arabs are rich enough to provide welfare for their families. But 
in my hometown, Muslim women still must have an economic role because of poverty. 
We regard this as an exempted condition, as Islamic rules can be flexible.” (Female) 
The fact that young Muslim men are stereotypically viewed with suspicion by author-
ities, also plays a role in socio-economic opportunities. As the three provinces are under 
martial law by Thai authorities, both younger men and adult males are often targeted 
in dragnet sweeps to find insurgents – operations that have been widely reported to re-
sult in indiscriminate detentions, abuses, and even disappearances (Human Rights Watch 
2007, 2010b, 2014). Focus group participants noted how these problems with authorities 
worked to curtail opportunities for young men both in school and professionally. This also 
supported the theme that men’s advancement should be prioritized, particularly in work, 
as either or both a means to improve everyday safety for male family members and as a 
form of collective solidarity against authorities: 
“Many boys who dropped from school or have no jobs were arrested because of some 
security reasons.” (Female)  
Table 4. Correlations 
Gender Equality Score  Factor 1  Factor 2
  Personal Choice  Family Choice 
Factor 1 Personal Choice  .240**  1  1 
Factor 2 Family Choice  −.048  1  1 
Through school or college  .059  .721**  −.125 
Online through the internet  .298**  .805**  −.411** 
Through dating  .195*  .828**  −.152 
Through friends  .094  .556**  .401** 
On parent’s request  .092  .087  .694** 
Through arranged marriage  −.032  −.074  .738** 
* Significance at p < 0.05 
** Significance at p < 0.01 
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“Male adolescents and adults are often eyed by the military. Many Muslim men are 
arrested by the authorities to retrieve information from them regarding security prob-
lems.” (Female) 
Similar concerns about safety were made regarding the question about men making 
better political leaders. One focus group participant stated that men are more appropri-
ate political leaders because they are more likely to be the targets of violence. This atti-
tude is not uncommon in the region. It has been widely reported that the Malay Muslim 
provinces of Thailand have the highest rates of political assassinations in the country, with 
victims being almost exclusively male and nearly 3/4ths being sub-district administrators 
(Vititanon 2011). Members of the focus group also believed that female involvement in 
political activities either made them vulnerable to sexual assaults, or to inappropriate re-
lationships with Thai government representatives or soldiers — an extremely sensitive is-
sue which has also been reported in the press (see, e.g., Bangkok Post 2012): 
“Men are more appropriate political leaders because it is not a safe job for women.” 
(Male) 
“Islam never forbids females to be involved in political matters. But students think 
males are better suited to be political leaders. The conditions of society support this 
attitude. In fact some Muslim females who have participated in political activities 
have been abused. I think this is related to sexual safety. The status of women in many 
ways is related to assuring their sexual safety.” (Female) 
A central theme focused around the importance of how educational opportunities, par-
ticularly Islamic education, would serve to improve the character and behavior of young 
men. The general conclusion of the focus group was that prioritizing opportunities for 
men in education would yield results that would benefit the Muslim communities in the 
area generally. Part of this was because of the perception that Islamic education would 
deter young men from engaging in harmful conduct, particularly drug use, which is a ma-
jor concern among local community members (see, e.g., Binwang and Laeheem 2013; Sa-
teemae et al. 2015): 
“Many boys in the villages are uneducated or unemployed, and refuse to acquire Is-
lam ... They are addicted to drugs, or more interested in music or movies.” (Female) 
“Some boys dropped out of school or no longer study religious curriculum. But we 
can see that the number of boys studying to become Hafiz (memorizers of the Quran) 
are increasing, and these schools are spreading in the area. The parents want to send 
their sons to these schools to get them away from drugs.” (Female) 
Another consistent and related theme was that greater education, again with an em-
phasis on Islamic values, would improve outcomes on personal levels as well. Focus group 
participants stressed that Islamic education would lead to better familial life through char-
acter development:  
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“My brother in law became better to my sister after he became involved in the Da’wah 
Tablighi (Islamic missionary) group.” (Male) 
“I want to marry with a man of high Islamic knowledge. Because I notice that most 
of them are good to their wives because of their good education in Islam.” (Female) 
“Divorce is common among families with less education and Islamic consciousness. 
They do not have enough knowledge to respect each other.” (Male) 
Additionally, focus group participants believed that education would lead to better po-
litical outcomes. There was support for the notion that Muslims must support each other, 
and that individual improvements would lead to overall better status for the Muslim com-
munity in Thailand generally: 
“Education and Islamic education is the solution for building peace in the area in ev-
ery level. Good politics derives from good education.” 
“Few educated men are appointed as political leaders. Some of them in politics have 
no skills in political administration.” 
“We are proud to be Muslim. We need to help each other as much as we can. Mus-
lims in Thailand are all brothers and sisters. We hope the next generation will be 
better, and that Muslims act in a more Islamic manner. That society as a whole will 
be more peaceful.” 
Discussion 
Our survey results indicate that there was relatively strong support for patriarchal values 
among our sample. Levels of support for patriarchy were in line with peer comparison 
groups from other Muslim populations, and also align with findings from other research-
ers indicating a preference for conservative social values among Muslim populations in 
general. On one hand this was not surprising given the fact that our sample was com-
posed of students from an Islamic university, where it can be assumed that there is strong 
adherence to collective identity norms. At the same time, our sample was composed of a 
majority of females, whom one might expect to have less support for patriarchy. 
Our results leave a number of unanswered questions, but present a greater need to 
conduct further research in this area. The major caveat of the study is that it is based on 
a convenience sample of students who we can assume are more religious than the gen-
eral population of Malay-Muslims in the area. Additionally, the sample was mainly female, 
though the university overall was also majority female. We used no objective measures to 
determine religiosity among our sample, or compare it to representatives from the gen-
eral population. As second limitation is that although the focus group was explanatory, 
it was not a comprehensive instrument to assess cognitive processes about patriarchy 
among the sample as a whole.  
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Despite these caveats, there are two notable findings of interest. First, there was a signif-
icant positive correlation between respondents’ Gender Equality Score — which reflected 
opposition to patriarchal values – and agency in courtship. A higher Gender Equality Score 
was also positively correlated with two individual courtship approaches that reflected in-
dependent agency in courtship. On the contrary, there were no significant negative cor-
relations between Gender Equality and agency in courtship. Thus, although the sample 
overall showed strong preferences for patriarchal values as measured by the World Values 
Survey items, there was a divergence of views on social practices which were associated 
with opposition to patriarchal values. This comports with the notion that although there 
may be some generalities to be made about Muslim preferences regarding social values, 
there are contradictions and nuances that deserve further examination. Of course, there 
are limitations to be noted in our observations. We used agency in courtship as a measure 
to approximate a relationship to support or opposition to patriarchal values – as reflected 
in the three World Values Survey items. There are no doubt other categories of social be-
havior that might serve as equally relevant or more appropriate reflections of support 
or opposition to patriarchal values. Indeed, within discourse about the relationship be-
tween agency and values, there is significant discussion within feminist and critical circles 
about this connection in general. We suggest that further research be done in the area of 
courtship preferences, and associations with other social values among this population. 
Secondly, the focus group discussion provided a number of insights explaining the high 
support for patriarchy as indicated in our sample’s responses. Here, many of the themes 
discussed highlighted the importance of dynamics specific to the local context influenc-
ing respondent views. One theme was based on the notion that the community as a whole 
should prioritize supporting young men in certain areas — foremost in education — to 
advance their status in both the personal and social realms. This idea reflected an active 
awareness that men in the community faced certain disadvantages that needed to be 
overcome. This population has not only been a historically marginalized minority group, 
but have also lived — and adapted to — an environment of continual violence and mar-
tial law. Many of the themes covered in the focus group thus reflected concerns regarding 
everyday violence and safety. In fact, security and safety considerations seemed to be the 
major theme that influenced respondents’ answers on the patriarchy preference questions. 
Other themes reflected nuanced considerations related to social status, pragmatic con-
cerns, or desires to overcome adverse conditions and improve overall outcomes for the 
Muslim community in Thailand generally. What was noticeably absent were any explicit 
themes reflecting bare chauvinism. Generally, the focus group spoke to the need to further 
investigate how local political and socio-economic contexts and lived experiences spe-
cific to communities of interest influence values, particularly for Muslim minority groups. 
A clear methodological and scholastic implication of our study is how it reveals the lim-
itations of quantitative analysis when viewed in isolation. Our quantitative results seemed 
to align with survey findings on Muslim values’ preferences towards patriarchy in stud-
ies conducted by other researchers. Such a conclusion might support an assumption that 
the principal driver of such value preferences must therefore be religion. Although we do 
not disagree that religion is obviously a central influence on social values, our focus group 
results strongly suggest that local realities and context were key determinants. This high-
lights the importance with which researchers must employ multiple means to engage this 
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population before drawing conclusions about values preferences. When viewed together, 
the quantitative and qualitative results constructed a much more comprehensive story 
than either set of data viewed alone. Given the extent to which scholarship and discourse 
about Muslim communities has increased in recent years, including by commentators who 
lack in-depth knowledge of Muslims or their local realities, scholars in this field should 
redouble efforts to examine context and engage local voices using multiple methods. 
Thus, we hope that this study will inspire greater interest in exploring complexities re-
lated to values preferences among this sample of Muslims in Thailand, or other Muslim 
minority populations generally. We also hope this discussion can expand to include meth-
odological and interdisciplinary considerations for research on Muslim values. Given the 
fact that empirical studies on Muslim populations in general are still lacking, at least in 
the western academic canon, more thorough and complex investigations are necessary 
to expand on existing empirical studies in this area, and challenge partial conclusions or 
unsubstantiated stereotypes.   
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